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This paper contributes to the ongoing debate about economic inequality in India during 
the post-reform period. We analyze consumption inequality through the hitherto 
neglected lens of nonfood expenditure. Using household level consumption expenditure 
data from the quinquennial “thick” rounds of the NSS, we show that inequality within 
food and non-food groups has declined, even as overall expenditure inequality has 
increased over time. We suggest that the rise in overall expenditure inequality is due to 
the increased weight in the household budget of non-food spending, which tends to be 
more unequal than food spending. We also show that inequality is very different across 
broad non-food items. Durables, education, healthcare, and consumer services show the 
most rapid increases in real expenditure, and also display the highest levels of inequality. 
Finally, we offer some possible mechanisms for this phenomenon and suggest policy 
measures to deal with this form of inequality. 
 
JEL Codes: O15; I31 
Keywords: consumption inequality; household data; India 
 
1. Introduction 
The neoliberal economic model, in place in India since the late 1980s, has been lauded for 
delivering high rates of growth but criticized for failing to create employment and for increasing 
economic inequality. While a few scholars still see India’s recent economic growth as being 
“inclusive” (Bhalla, 2011; Bhagwati and Panagariya, 2013), a much larger body of work 
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suggests that consumption, income, and wealth inequality have all risen since the 1990s (Sen and 
Himanshu, 2004a; 2004b; Pal and Ghosh, 2007; Jayadev et al. 2011; Subramanian and Jayaraj, 
2013). Some mechanisms that have been suggested in this literature to explain rising inequality 
are agrarian distress (leading to stagnant or weakly rising incomes for the vast majority of rural 
households), jobless growth in the formal manufacturing sector accompanied by a growth in 
casual and informal employment, and increased returns to higher education in the new service 
economy.  
 
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate over the dynamics of economic inequality in India 
during the post-reform period by focusing on a novel angle: the distinction between food and 
non-food expenditure.1 All previous studies that have analyzed consumption inequality along 
class, caste, and regional dimensions, have examined household expenditures as a whole. 
However, trends in spending on food and nonfood items (like consumer durables, education, 
healthcare, and other services) are significantly different. For instance, most of the increase in 
total expenditure in real terms in the recent decades can be accounted for by the increase on non-
food items. Average food expenditures have been nearly stagnant in real terms in rural and urban 
areas (Figure 1 below, and Deaton and Dreze, 2009). In recent work we have discussed the 
possible causes and implications of this “food budget squeeze” for nutrition and poverty (Basole 
and Basu, 2015). In this paper, to the best of our knowledge the first one to do so, we discuss 
implications of different trends of food and nonfood expenditures on consumption inequality.  
 
1 At the outset we note that consumption inequality is typically much lower than income inequality, which in turn is 




                                                        
 Another aspect of the present study is worth noting at the outset. Most studies on inequality use 
relative inequality measures such as the Gini coefficient or percentile ratios. While these 
measures give important insights into the distribution of consumption expenditure and/or 
income, they miss out on a crucial dimension of inequality: changes in absolute differences in 
expenditure and/or income in the population (Subramanian and Jayaraj, 2013; Ravallion, 2014). 
In this paper, we analyze relative (scale-invariant), absolute (translation-invariant) and 
intermediate inequality measures.2 
 
Drawing on data from the quinquennial “thick” rounds of the Consumption Expenditure Survey 
(CES) of the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO), our analysis of household 
expenditures over a 25-year period from 1987-88 to 2011-12 uncovers several interesting trends. 
First, we find that in both rural and urban areas, relative inequality within food and non-food 
groups has declined (or remained unchanged) over time, even as overall expenditure inequality 
has increased. This must mean that the observed rise in overall expenditure inequality is due to 
the increased weight in the household budget of non-food spending, which tends to be more 
unequal than food spending. Second, we find that absolute inequality in food spending has been 
stagnant (or has fallen), while it has increased very rapidly for non-food expenditure. Third, it is 
possible to identify three distinct periods within the overall analysis period: between 1987 and 
1994 inequality either decreases or rises weakly, between 1994 and 2004 there is a strong 
increase in inequality, followed by a weaker but still increasing trend between 2004 and 2011. 
2 For ease of comparability with the existing literature, the term “Gini coefficient” without any prefix will refer to 
the relative Gini coefficient. When we wish to refer to the absolute or intermediate Gini coefficient, we will explicit 
use the prefix “absolute” or “intermediate”.  
 3 
                                                        
Finally, we find that inequality is significantly different across major categories of non-food 
items. Expenditure on durables, education, healthcare, and consumer services have not only seen 
the most rapid increases in real terms but also show the highest levels of relative inequality. This 
reinforces our belief that the increase in relative consumption inequality observed at the 
aggregate level can be largely explained by the increased importance in the household budget of 
non-food items.  
 
A question that immediately arises is, are these trends a cause for concern and policy 
intervention? Or do they merely reflect the “normal” process of economic growth wherein 
household budgets diversify, in the process increasing inequality? We believe that concern is 
warranted for two reasons. Firstly, even if the rising inequality were the result of a “normal” 
process of growth, the fact remains that this makes the underlying process unjust, exclusionary 
and unsustainable. It is precisely because the growth process is accompanied by increasing 
inequality that policy interventions from the State to reduce inequality is called for. Second, it is 
worth noting that the inequality of non-food consumption is extremely high and has declined 
only gradually in relative terms. In absolute terms, it has increased enormously. On this count, 
the absolute gap between the rich and poor has widened. The fact that the growth process is 
bypassing the majority calls into serious question claims about a rising tide lifting all boats. 
These oft neglected dimensions of inequality are not only worthy of scholarly attention but call 
for long term policy intervention. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on trends and 
measures of inequality in the Indian context. Section 3 describes the data and methods used in 
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this paper. Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes the discussion with some policy 
recommendations and thoughts about future research. 
 
2. Inequality in the post-reform period: Trends and Measures 
 
Even though the literature on economic inequality in India is smaller than that on poverty and 
nutrition, it has grown rapidly in recent years. Several studies have attempted to analyze trends in 
consumption, income and wealth inequality in India and offer explanations for them (Sen and 
Himanshu, 2004a; 2004b; Banerjee and Piketty, 2005; Dutta, 2005; Pal and Ghosh, 2007; Cain et 
al., 2010; Jayadev et al., 2011; Zacharias and Vakulabharnam, 2011; Motiram and 
Vakulabharanam, 2012; Basole, 2014). Since good data on income or wealth are hard to come by 
or cover only a small fraction of the population, most studies of inequality in India study 
consumption expenditure inequality using data from the CES conducted by the NSSO.  
 
Over the past two decades, the central question addressed by the literature is whether inequality 
has increased significantly after the onset of neoliberal economic reforms in 1991. Pal and Ghosh 
(2007) review the controversy that occurred in the early years of this century over this question. 
Part of the disagreement over the trend movement in inequality (and poverty) came from the 
incompatibility of the 55th NSS round (1999-2000) with earlier (and later) rounds. Thus, while 
Bhalla (2003) found that the all-India consumption Gini had decreased in the 1990s, Deaton and 
Dreze (2002) found evidence for a “pervasive increase in economic inequality in the nineties.” 
They noted that this is a new development in the Indian economy because until 1993-94 the Gini 
coefficient of consumption expenditure for the whole country was fairly stable. Sen and 
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Himanshu (2004a) reached a similar result and also offered revised estimates based on 
corrections to the 55th round data. Dev and Ravi (2007) avoided the complications of the 55th 
round by comparing the pre-reform period 1983/1993-94 with the post-reform 1993-94/2004-05 
using data from a uniform reference period of 30 days. Their computation show that inequality 
moved in opposite directions in the two periods, declining (or remaining stagnant) in the pre-
reform period and increasing in the post-reform period. For rural India, the Gini coefficient of 
consumption expenditure fell from 0.308 in 1983 to 0.286 in 1993-94, and then increased to 
0.305 in 2004-05. For urban India, the corresponding values were 0.341, 0.343 and 0.375.3  
 
The availability of the 2004-2005 (61st round) NSS data more or less settled the question of the 
overall dynamics of inequality. It is now clear that overall inequality within rural and urban India 
has increased in the 1990s and 2000s after being relatively unchanged in the 1980s (Himanshu 
2007; Cain et al., 2010; Motiram and Vakulabharman 2011; but see Krishna and Sethupathy 
2011 for an opposing view). This holds true not only for consumption but also for income and 
wealth inequality (Motiram and Vakulabharnam, 2011, Table 5.4). The Gini coefficient for per 
capita total net worth increased from 0.64 in 1991 to 0.66 in 2002 (Jayadev et al. 2011). Dutta 
(2005) found that the trend in wage inequality among regular salaried workers paralleled the 




3 Using data from mixed reference periods, they also compare two sub-periods of the post-reform era, 1993-
94/1999-00 and 1999-00/2004-05. They find that the rate of decline of poverty was higher in the second period. 
They flag this result as surprising because the second period was known to perform worse in terms of other 
indicators like agricultural growth. 
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A second, and related, set of questions concerns the magnitude of the increase in inequality and 
whether this is something to be concerned about, both from an ethical perspective and from the 
point of view of poverty reduction. It could be argued that the increase in inequality is modest 
and not a matter of concern because it has been accompanied by poverty reduction (Cain et al., 
2010). However, Dev and Ravi (2007) note that, in urban areas, where inequality has risen faster 
than in rural areas, the relationship between growth in monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) 
and decline in poverty is weaker. They conclude that poverty would have declined much faster in 
the absence of the increases in inequality in urban areas. Since the rate of increase in inequality 
has an impact on the rate of decline of poverty ceteris paribus, its study has obvious policy 
implications from a development perspective. 
 
Further, the conclusion that the increase in inequality has been modest relies on the particular 
measures of inequality that have been most commonly used in the literature. Subramanian and 
Jayaraj (2013) point out that measures of relative inequality (such as the relative Gini coefficient 
that has been most frequently used by researchers) understate inequality and recommend that 
such measures be used in conjunction with measures of absolute inequality.4 They note that 
equal rates of growth of consumption across the distribution are compatible with increasing 
absolute differences in the level of consumption, differences that are not captured by the relative 
Gini coefficient. Using absolute and intermediate Gini coefficients (see the next section for 
definitions of these measures) they report large increases in consumption expenditure inequality 
in the post-reform period, especially in urban areas. 
 
4 A relative inequality measure is one whose value remains unchanged when an income distribution is uniformly 
scaled up or down by any factor, while an absolute inequality measure is one whose value remains unchanged when 
the same income is added to (or subtracted from) every income in a distribution (Subramanian and Jayaraj, 2013). 
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 To motivate the empirical analysis in this paper, we will now briefly review the explanations 
advanced in the literature for the increase in inequality since the early 1990s. One line of 
research has emphasized the change in the policy regime that was the result of the adoption of 
neoliberal reforms in the early 1990s (Patnaik, 2007). Key aspects of this policy regime have 
been reduction in public investment, especially in agriculture, increasing the openness of the 
economy to international trade and capital flows, and a conservative fiscal policy stance. The 
results of the systematic neglect of the agricultural sector have been stagnation in agriculture and 
agrarian distress. Since the majority of the workforce is still employed in agriculture, stagnation 
in that sector has contributed to aggregate inequality by increasing the divergence in average 
incomes between agriculture, industry and services (Basu and Das, 2012).  
 
Another line of research has emphasized that the increase in equality is more pronounced in 
urban areas, and has argued that the increase in the returns to education is an important 
contributing factor, especially for households that rely on education-intensive sources of income 
(Cain, et al., 2010). Analysis of wage trends since 1983 has found that wage inequality increased 
for regular workers but declined for casual workers. Key factors driving patterns of wage 
inequality have been found to be human capital (age and educational attainment), geographic 
location and industry affiliation (Dutta, 2005).  
 
The new policy regime has also had more direct distributional impacts. Large subsidies to the 
rich, in the form of tax breaks, and neglect of public provisioning of health care and education 
(which are implicit subsidies for the poor) have imparted a pronounced regressive distributional 
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bias (Pal and Ghosh, 2007). One important implication of declining public support for education 
and healthcare as well as increased rural-urban migration due to rural distress, is rising 
expenditure on services like schooling, medicines, and transport. As a consequence spending on 
these items has increased rapidly in real terms and as a share of the household budget in rural and 
urban areas (Basole and Basu, 2015). As we show here, this has important implications for rising 
inequality. 
With this brief review of possible mechanisms that have caused the rise in inequality, we now 
turn to a discussion of our data sources and empirical methodology.  
 
3. Data and Methods 
3.1. Data 
Household-level data from five NSS “thick” rounds (1987-88, 1993-94, 2004-05, 2009-10, and 
2011-12) were used in this analysis. Round 55 (1999-2000) was omitted for well-known 
problems that make compatibility with other rounds difficult. After pooling data from all the 5 
rounds for the 15 “major states” (see below), the total sample size was 459329 households 
(287611 for rural and 171718 for urban). The main variables of interest for this study are total 
per capita real expenditure, and per capita expenditure on broad item groups – like food, fuel, 
education, medical, conveyance, consumer services, clothing & footwear, durables, rent. The key 
objective of this study is to analyze the distribution of per capita real expenditure in India over a 
two-decade period from 1987-88 to 2011-12, and relate it to changes in the composition of 
expenditure in terms of food and nonfood items. For households located in rural areas, real 
expenditure was calculated by deflating nominal expenditure by the state-level consumer price 
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indices for agricultural labourers (CPIAL); for urban households, similar calculations were done 
using the state-level consumer price index for industrial workers (CPIIW).  
 
The spatial dimension of variation in prices is important for studying inequality. That is why we 
use state-level price indices. But this comes at a cost in terms of reduction in sample size. State-
level price indices, going back to 1987-88, are only available for the following 15 major states: 
Andhra Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Gujarat, Jammu & Kashmir, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya 
Pradesh, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. 
Together these states accounted for about 82 percent of Indian households in 2011-12. Hence, 
our analysis, even if restricted to these states only, relates to the vast majority of the Indian 
population. 
 
To construct a consistent series for the CPIAL and CPIIW at the state level going back all the 
way to 1987-88, we used data from two sources. For historical data, we used the Economic and 
Political Weekly Research Foundation India Time Series database, and for more recent years we 
used data available in published reports of the Labour Bureau of the Ministry of Labour & 
Employment, Government of India. Using data from both these sources, we constructed time 
series for state-level CPIAL and CPIIW with 1960-61 as the base year. Hence, all real 
expenditures in this study are expressed in terms of 1960-61 prices. Note that while interpreting 
real expenditure data it is more important to focus on the changes over time rather than the levels 
whose precise amount may change depending on the deflators used.5 
 
5 One cautionary note is in order before we begin. Since we take expenditure as a proxy for welfare, the assumption 
is that higher expenditures levels indicate a better-off household than lower expenditure levels. In general this 
assumption is valid, but there is one important exception, viz. rent. We cannot assume that, between otherwise 
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 3.2. Relative, Absolute and Intermediate Measures of Inequality 
Consider an economy composed of 𝑁𝑁 individuals, with 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 referring to expenditure (or income) of 
the 𝑖𝑖-th individual, with 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2, … ,𝑁𝑁. Let  𝜇𝜇 = (1 𝑁𝑁)⁄ ∑ 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  refer to the mean expenditure in this 
economy. There are various ways to measure the inequality in the distribution of expenditure in 
this economy (see Sen, 1997). In this paper, we will focus on three measures: the relative Gini 
coefficient, the absolute Gini coefficient, and the intermediate Gini coefficient. 
 
While the relative Gini coefficient is usually explained with the use of the Lorenz curve, there is 
an alternative way to understand it. In the 𝑁𝑁 individual economy under consideration, consider 
arranging individuals in an increasing order of their expenditure and then comparing two 
randomly picked expenditures. Since there are 𝑁𝑁2 possible pairs of expenditures (including 
pairing of an expenditure with itself), the expected value of the absolute difference between a 
random pair of expenditures is given by  
𝐷𝐷� = 1
𝑁𝑁2




𝑖𝑖=1 .       (1) 










𝑖𝑖=1 .      (2) 
The relative Gini coefficient is defined as half of 𝐷𝐷� normalized by the mean of the distribution, 
𝜇𝜇:  
identical households, the one paying rent is “better-off” than the one living in its own house. This problem is more 
severe in urban areas where nearly half the households report paying rent, than in the rural areas where only 5% do 
so. Since we do not have the data necessary to impute a rent value for own housing we leave out rent expenditures in 
our analysis of inequality to avoid estimates of inequality that are artificially inflated due to this reason. 
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𝑖𝑖=1 �.     (3) 
Thus, we can see that the two Gini’s are related as follows: 
𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴 = 𝜇𝜇 × 𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅.        (4) 
This way of looking at the Gini allows us to offer an intuitive interpretation of these two Gini 
coefficients. A relative Gini coefficient of 𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅 means that if we take any 2 households from the 
population at random, the expected absolute difference in their expenditure (or income) is 2𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅 
per cent of the mean expenditure (or income). Thus, a rise in the Gini coefficient from 30 to 40 
per cent, say, implies that the expected difference has gone up from 60 to 80 per cent of the mean 
(Atkinson and Morelli, 2014). In a similar vein, an absolute Gini coefficient of 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴 means that if 
we take 2 households from the population at random, the expected difference in their expenditure 
(or income) is 2𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴 (in whatever units we measure expenditure or income). 
 
The absolute Gini coefficient also has an alternative interpretation in terms of relative 
deprivation. A plausible theory about attitudes to social inequality suggests that deprivation is 
felt by individuals from a comparison with those higher up in the hierarchy (of income or 
expenditure or wealth or power). According to this view, deprivation is associated with the 
relative position one occupies in the distribution, i.e., relative to those more fortunate than 
oneself. This would suggest that deprivation from not having some level of expenditure (or 
income) 𝑌𝑌 is an increasing function of the proportion of those who have 𝑌𝑌. This notion of 
deprivation can be quantified to show that 𝜇𝜇 × 𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅 is aggregate relative deprivation in society. 
Thus, the absolute Gini coefficient is a measure of relative deprivation in a society (Yitzhaki, 
1979).     
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The fact that the two Gini coefficients differ with respect to normalization by the mean leads to 
drastically different properties: while 𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅 becomes scale-invariant, 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴 becomes translation-
invariant. This means that the former measure will remain unchanged as long as the proportion 
of expenditures of individuals remain unchanged (no matter what their absolute difference), and 
the latter measure will remain unchanged as long as the absolute differences in expenditures 
between individuals remain unchanged (no matter what their proportion). Thus, whereas the first 
measure is only sensitive to the proportion (or scale) of expenditures in the economy, the second 
measure is sensitive to the absolute difference of expenditures in the economy..  
 
To understand the difference, imagine two scenarios. Let us think of a society with two 
individuals, the first having monthly expenditure of Rs. 1000 and the second Rs. 5000. Suppose, 
in the first scenario their expenditures rise to Rs. 10000 and Rs. 50000; and in the second 
scenario, they increase to Rs. 11000 and Rs. 15000. If we were measuring inequality with 𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅, 
then we would consider the first scenario to be no more unequal than the original situation 
(because the proportion of expenditures of both individuals remain unchanged at 5). But, if we 
measured inequality using 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴 then we would consider the first scenario to be more unequal than 
the original situation (because the absolute difference in expenditures of the two individuals has 
increased from Rs. 4000 to Rs. 40000). Now compare the second scenario to the original 
situation. If we use 𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅 as our measure of inequality, we would suggest that inequality has 
declined (because the ratio of expenditures has fallen from 5 to 1.36). But if we use 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴 as the 
measure of inequality, we would say that inequality remains unchanged (because the absolute 
difference in their expenditures remain constant at Rs. 4000). 
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Both measures have advantages and disadvantages. The advantage of 𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅 is that its value is 
independent of the units in which we measure expenditure – and always lies between 0 and 1, 
with 0 referring to a situation of perfect equality and 1 referring to perfect inequality –, but its 
disadvantage is that it does not capture changes in the absolute gap in expenditures in society 
which may be important for reasons discussed above. The advantage of 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴 is that it is sensitive 
to, and picks up, changes in absolute differences in expenditure, but its disadvantage is that its 
value is dependent on the unit of measurement of expenditure. For instance, if instead of 
measuring expenditure in rupees, we measure it in paise, the value of 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴 will increase 100-fold 
even though we know that nothing has changed as far the distribution of expenditure in India is 
concerned. Again, if we deflate expenditures of all individuals by some price index to get “real” 
expenditure, the value of 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴 will go down even when the distribution of expenditures in society 
has not changed. That is, 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴 will always show lower levels of inequality in real expenditure than 
in nominal expenditure.6  
 
The fact that both measures have its strengths and weaknesses leads us to refrain from suggesting 
that one measure is unambiguously “better” than the other. In our view, each measure captures a 
different and important aspect of the inequality in the distribution of expenditure. One way to 
combine both measures and yet get unit consistency is to use the intermediate Gini coefficient, 
which is a product of both 
𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼 = 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴 × 𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅 = 𝜇𝜇 × (𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅)2.      (5) 
6 The unit-dependence of 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴 becomes even more problematic when we compare different countries. For instance, it 
is well known that the US is much more unequal in its distribution of wealth than Sweden (and other Northern 
European countries). If we use 𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅 as the measure of inequality, we get this familiar result. Instead, if we use 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴 as 
the measure of inequality, Sweden can come out as more unequal by a suitable change in the unit of measurement of 
wealth in Sweden. 
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The intermediate Gini coefficient is useful because it is sensitive to changes in both proportions 
and additions of expenditure, which it inherits from the two Gini coefficients. Its greatest 
advantage is that it is a unit consistent measure (Subramanian and Jayaraj, 2013). Hence, its 
values are not dependent on the unit of measurement of expenditure. This makes comparisons 
over time and space easy and intuitive. 
 
3.3. Inequality Decomposition 
It is often interesting to decompose overall inequality, no matter how it is measured, into its 
component parts. In this paper, we will use a source decomposition – deriving from Lerman and 
Yitzhaki (1985) – that allows us to understand the contribution of different types of expenditure 
to inequality in total expenditure.  
 
Using Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985), we can show that, if total expenditure for every individual is 
composed of 𝑗𝑗 components, i.e., 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗  where 𝑖𝑖 indexes individuals and 𝑗𝑗 indexes types of 
expenditure, then the relative Gini coefficient can be decomposed as follows 
𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅 = ∑ � 𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗,𝐹𝐹)
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗,𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗)� × �𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐(𝑦𝑦𝑗𝑗,𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗)𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 �× �𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗𝜇𝜇 �𝑗𝑗 ≡ ∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗    (4) 
where 𝐹𝐹 and 𝐹𝐹𝑗𝑗 refer to the cumulative distribution function of total and the 𝑗𝑗-th type of 
expenditure, and 𝜇𝜇 and 𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗 refer to mean of total and the 𝑗𝑗-th type of expenditure.  
 
The first component in (4), 𝑅𝑅𝑗𝑗, is the “Gini correlation” between the 𝑗𝑗-th type of expenditure and 
total expenditure (the correlation of the 𝑗𝑗-th type of expenditure with the rank of total 
expenditure); the second component, 𝐺𝐺𝑗𝑗𝑅𝑅, is the relative Gini coefficient of the 𝑗𝑗-th type of 
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expenditure; and the third component, 𝑆𝑆𝑗𝑗, is the share of the 𝑗𝑗-th type of expenditure in total 
expenditure. The decomposition in (4) is useful for us because it allows us to study the relative 
contribution of food and nonfood expenditures to inequality in total expenditure.    
 
4. Results 
4.1 Growing Importance of Non-Food Expenditures 
As real household incomes grow, there is an expected change in the composition of the 
household budget: a decrease in the share of expenditures going to food items and an increase in 
the share going to non-food items. India follows this expected pattern. The share of food 
expenditure has steadily fallen from 60-70% to 40-50% (Figure 1, right column). In urban areas 
the shares have reversed themselves in the period of analysis and non-food expenditure now 
accounts for nearly 60% of total household expenditure. But a striking and unexpected fact about 
the Indian growth experience is that not only has the share of expenditure on food fallen, but the 
levels of expenditure on food items have been stagnant in real terms in both rural and urban areas 
(Figure 1, left column). Stagnant real expenditure on food, in conjunction with a diversification 
of diets (that leads to a substitution of more expensive calories for cheaper ones), have resulted 
in declining calorie intake. This is a surprising result for a society in which the vast majority is 
still undernourished (Deaton and Dreze, 2009; Basole and Basu, 2015). Meanwhile the level of 
non-food expenditures have exploded. According to NSS data, while real food expenditures 
increased by a mere 10% in rural areas between 1987-88 and 2011-12, non-food expenditures 
went up by a whopping 224% over the same period. The corresponding figures for urban India 
were 9.8% and 459%.  
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 [Figure 1 about here] 
 
One possible explanation for this puzzling phenomenon is that these aggregate data hide 
variation across the expenditure distribution and that the rapid increase in non-food expenditures 
at the expense of food expenditures is observed only for relatively well-off households. Figure 2 
shows that this is not the case and that food expenditures have been mostly stagnant while non-
food expenditures have been rising for all deciles (the topmost decile has been excluded from the 
figure to make the trends in lower deciles easier to observe). Since food expenditures are more or 
less flat across the whole MPCE distribution, understanding the dynamics of expenditure 
inequality in India requires us to focus more closely on non-food expenditures which have not 
been analyzed separately thus far. 
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
4.2 Level, Share and Growth of Non-Food Items in the Household Budget 
Compared to the composition of the food budget, the non-food budget has been less analyzed in 
the literature. But the increasing penetration of telecommunications and other services into rural 
areas, the enclosure or disappearance of forests and other common-pool resources, the 
privatization of healthcare and education, and increased short-term and long-term rural-urban 
migration all have clear implications for spending on fuel, transportation, education, health care, 
consumer services, and other nonfood items. We see that these items have all significantly 
increased their share in the total budget in both rural and urban areas, in some cases nearly 
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doubling over the 1987-88 values (Tables 1 and 2). Figure 3 shows the growth rate of real 
expenditure on all eight items listed in Tables 1 and 2. Real spending on education, healthcare, 
services, conveyance, and durables grew three to four times over this period in both rural and 
urban areas.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
If consumption expenditure is taken as a straightforward proxy for welfare, such increases in 
expenditure on education, health and other services could be interpreted as a welcome 
development. It would indicate an increase in the real purchasing power of the population. 
However, two cautionary notes are in order before reaching this conclusion. First, as indicated 
earlier, this increase in expenditure on services has come at the expense of food in a situation 
where the vast majority of the population continue to remain under-nourished. This would 
suggest that, probably, not all is well. Second, as we discuss next, inequality in non-food 
expenditure is much higher than in food expenditure so that the poor benefit relatively less than 
the rich with an aggregate shift towards nonfood expenditures.  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
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4.3 Trends in Relative, Absolute and Intermediate Measures of Inequality  
As noted earlier, several studies have shown that there has been a modest increase in 
consumption inequality in India in the post-reform period. Broadly in agreement with these 
studies, we also find that the overall expenditure Gini at the all-India level increased from 0.312 
in 1987-88 to 0.342 in 2011-12, with the largest increase coming between 1993-94 and 2004-05. 
But when we investigate inequality across various dimensions of disaggregation, by sub-groups 
– rural and urban – and source of expenditure – food and non-food – some interesting patterns 
emerge.  
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
When we study inequality across the rural and urban sectors, we see an increase in consumption 
inequality within each sector, with urban areas registering a sharper increase. While the all-India 
Gini coefficient for total expenditure rises by 9.79% between 1987-88 and 2011-12 (from 0.312 
to 0.342), in the rural areas the increase is only 4.32% (from 0.289 to 0.301) and in the urban 
areas it is 13.44% (from 0.333 to 0.378). This means that in rural India, the average absolute 
difference in the consumption expenditure of two randomly selected individuals increased from 
62% of mean expenditure in 1987-88 to 68% of mean expenditure in 2011-12; for urban India, 
the corresponding change was from 66% of mean expenditure in 1987-88 to 76% of mean 
expenditure in 2011-12. 
 
But on disaggregating further, we see an interesting pattern. In rural India, even as both food and 
non-food expenditure has become less unequal, total expenditure has become more unequal. The 
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Gini for food has declined from 0.265 to 0.243; the Gini for nonfood has declined from 0.403 to 
0.395; the Gini for total (i.e., food plus nonfood) expenditure has increased from 0.289 to 0.301. 
This indicates that an important part of story of rising inequality in rural India derives from 
changes in the composition of expenditure between the broad groups of food and nonfood items. 
On the other hand, the pattern is more along expected lines in urban India. Nonfood expenditure 
has become much more unequal, but food expenditure has become less unequal. The Gini for 
food has declined from 0.286 to 0.272; the Gini for nonfood has increased from 0.435 to 0.462; 
the Gini for total expenditure has increased from 0.333 to 0.378.  
 
The pattern of rising inequality at the aggregate level, but falling inequality within food and/or 
non-food expenditure is seen not only in the Gini but also in other measures of inequality such as 
the 90/10, 50/10 and 10/50 percentile ratios (Table 4). In rural India, the ratio of total 
expenditure at the 90th and 10th percentiles of the MPCE distribution increases from 3.31 to 3.46 
between 1987-88 and 2011-12. For food expenditure, the corresponding ratio declines from 3.14 
to 2.93, and for nonfood expenditure also it declines from 5.27 to 5.01. In urban India, we see a 
pattern that mirrors movements in the Gini. The ratio of total expenditure at the 90th and 10th 
percentiles of the MPCE distribution increases from 4.32 to 5.09. The corresponding ratio for 
food expenditure declines from 3.59 to 3.29, but it increases for nonfood expenditure from 6.93 
to 7.81.  
 
This naturally brings up the question, why has overall consumption inequality increased if there 
has been a decrease in food and/or non-food inequality over time? The answer lies in the 
changing composition of household budgets, which have seen shifts towards non-food spending. 
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The fact that nonfood spending tends to be much more unequal than expenditure on food, in 
conjunction with the compositional change, explains the increase in overall consumption 
inequality. Applying this reasoning to urban areas we may surmise that the higher increase in 
inequality in urban areas is due to two factors operating simultaneously: an increase in non-food 
spending inequality and an increase in the share of the non-food budget in the overall budget. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
This hypothesis can be verified by decomposing the rural and urban consumption Gini by 
expenditure source according to the methodology developed by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) and 
explained in section 3.3 above. Recall that the Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) methodology 
decomposes the overall Gini into contributions from different sources of expenditure, where the 
contribution of a source is a product of its share in total expenditure, its own Gini, and its Gini 
correlation with total income. Table 5 shows the decomposition results for each time period for 
rural and urban India separately with food and nonfood expenditure being the two mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive sources.  
 
In rural India, the contribution of non-food spending to the overall Gini increased steadily from 
42% in 1987-88 to 65% in 2011-12. In 1987-88, 58% of rural inequality (as measured by the 
Gini) was due to inequality in food consumption; by 2011-12, this had fallen to 35%. We see a 
similar pattern in urban India over the same time period, with an even greater contribution of 
non-food spending, as might be expected. In 1987-88, 46% of the overall Gini was explained by 
the inequality in food expenditure; by 2011-12, this had fallen to 23%. For both rural and urban 
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India, the rise in the explanatory power of nonfood expenditure for overall expenditure inequality 
is driven by an increase in the share of nonfood expenditure in household budgets and an 
increase in the Gini correlation coefficient of nonfood with total expenditure. Thus the increase 
in overall consumption inequality that has been observed by many researchers is largely due to 
the increasing importance of non-food spending in the household budget, which tends to be more 
unequal than food spending. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
At this point, it may be tempting to conclude that the trends analyzed above are a normal part of 
the process of economic development. As income increases and budgets diversify, the share of 
non-food items increases and this increases aggregate inequality modestly. But the fact that 
inequality seems to increase only modestly is tied to the measures that are most commonly used 
for the purpose. For instance, the Gini coefficient, as well the percentile ratios, are relative 
measures of inequality. It is equally important to know what has happened to absolute measures 
of inequality in this period. One measure of absolute inequality is the absolute Gini, which is just 
the relative Gini multiplied by the mean of the distribution being examined (see section 3.2 
above). Real-world implications of inequality in terms of political influence, social tensions etc., 
may depend more closely on absolute than on relative aspects, and there is evidence to suggest 
that people are sensitive to this aspect of inequality (Ravallion, 2014). But as we noted in section 
3.2 above, the absolute Gini is unit inconsistent. Hence, it is better to use the intermediate Gini 
coefficient, which is sensitive to changes in absolute gap in expenditures but is also unit 
consistent. 
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In addition to the relative Gini, Table 3 shows the absolute and intermediate Gini for total, food, 
and non-food spending over the analysis period. Interestingly, the stagnant or declining trend in 
food inequality is no longer seen with the absolute Gini. But a clear difference emerges in the 
absolute Gini measures for food and non-food spending. While the absolute Gini for food shows 
a weakly increasing or uneven trend (with most of the increase concentrated in the 2000s), the 
absolute Gini for nonfood shows a robust increase over the entire period. For instance, the 
absolute Gini coefficient for nonfood expenditure increased from 3.325 in 1987-88 to 8.042 in 
2011-12, an increase of 142%. This means that in 1987-88, the average absolute difference in 
nonfood expenditure between two randomly picked individuals in rural India was 3.33 rupees 
(using 1960-61 prices); this had increased to 8.04 rupees in 2011-12. For urban areas, the 
corresponding change in the absolute Gini coefficient of nonfood expenditure is from 6.595 in 
1987-88 to 17.322 in 2011-12 (or 163%). Thus, there is a 2.4-fold increase in the non-food 
absolute Gini in rural areas and a 2.6-fold increase in urban areas.  
 
Turning to the evolution of the intermediate Gini coefficient, recall that this measure has the twin 
advantage of being sensitive to absolute differences in expenditure (like the absolute Gini) and 
yet being unit-free (like the relative Gini). Unlike the relative Gini for total expenditure which 
shows only a mild increase of 4% in rural and 13% in urban areas, the intermediate Gini for total 
expenditure increased a whopping 74% (from 2.048 to 3.577) in rural areas and an even stronger 
117% (from 3.880 to 8.425) in urban areas. This increase came entirely from non-food spending. 
For food expenditure, the intermediate Gini has declined in both rural and urban India. In the 
former, it declined from 1.142 in 1987-88 to 0.936 in 2001-12, before inching up to 1.124 in 
2011-12. In urban areas, it declined from 1.63 in 1987-88 to 1.596 in 2011-12. Nonfood 
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expenditure shows a starkly different trend: the intermediate Gini coefficient has secularly 
increased over time. It has increased about 2.4-fold in rural areas (from 1.338 to 3.178) and about 
2.8-fold in urban areas (from 2.871 to 7.995).   
 
Finally, we note that the period of analysis between 1987-88 and 2011-12 can be divided into 
three distinct phases based on the dynamics of the Gini. The first phase from 1987 to 1994 shows 
stagnant relative and mildly increasing absolute inequality. The second phase from 1994 to 2004 
shows the most rapid increase in all measures of inequality. And the third phase from 2004 to 
2011 shows an increasing trend in inequality, albeit at a slower rate than the previous period. 
 
To summarize, we observe the following broad trends. Over the post-reform period, inequality of 
total expenditure has increased mildly if measured by the relative Gini coefficient and strongly if 
measured by the absolute or intermediate Gini coefficient. Most of the increase in the relative 
Gini is driven by an increase in the weight of non-food spending in the household budget, which 
is much more unequal than expenditure on food. The rapid increase in the absolute or 
intermediate Gini for non-food expenditure is driven primarily by the increase in mean non-food 
expenditure (because the relative Gini is stable). Food inequality has been stagnant or falling, 
measured both by the relative and absolute Gini coefficients. While this last point appears to be a 
welcome development, recall that food expenditures have been largely stagnant in real terms. 
Thus the decrease (or stability) in inequality is accompanied by inadequate or low levels of 
spending on nutrition. On the other hand, average non-food spending shows a robust increase, 
which translates into a strong increase in inequality (measured by the absolute or intermediate 
Gini). 
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4.4 Inequality within components of non-food spending 
Which are the items of non-food spending that have contributed most to increasing inequality? 
To address this question, we disaggregate non-food spending into seven categories: fuel, 
education, healthcare, consumer services, conveyance, clothing and footwear, and durables.7 
Table 6 presents estimates of relative, absolute and intermediate expenditure Gini coefficients for 
each of the seven non-food items over time. There are some interesting patterns. 
 
First, the Gini coefficients vary considerably over the seven items. Fuel and clothing have the 
lowest Gini coefficients, in the range of 0.3-0.4 for the relative Gini (higher for urban than rural 
areas). At the other end, expenditure on durables, education and health care have very high Gini 
coefficients, in the range of 0.8-0.9 for the relative Gini (higher for urban than rural areas). 
Second, there is no clear time-trend in the magnitude of the relative Gini coefficient, except for 
clothing which declined sharply between 1987-88 and 2004-05 and has been relatively flat since 
then (more so in rural than in urban areas). Third, the magnitude of the absolute as well as the 
intermediate Gini coefficients has increased for all seven categories. The largest increases in the 
have been registered in expenditure on education and durables in rural India, and in education, 
durables, and services in urban India. The smallest increases have been registered in expenditure 
on clothing and fuel.  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
 
7 We leave out certain small items such as entertainment, minor durable-type goods, toilet articles, other household 
consumables. 
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These differences are more or less along expected lines, given that clothing and fuel, like food, 
are necessities, while durables have a strong luxury good component. It is also this “white 
goods” component that has assumed greater importance in the neoliberal period with the rise of a 
new consuming middle classes. Putting together the fact that spending on durables as well as 
education, healthcare and consumer services has increased very steeply (see Figure 3) with the 
unequal nature of this spending, we can identify another mechanism for increased consumption 
inequality. Those items that tend to be unequally distributed are the ones that have the seen the 
most rapid increases in the household budget. 
  
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
There is a large and distinguished literature that has studied poverty and inequality in India. This 
literature took a new turn with the onset of the neoliberal reforms in the early 1990s. A key 
question that emerged was the effect of the reforms on the evolution of poverty and inequality. A 
survey of the existing literature shows that there is broad agreement on an interpretation of trends 
for both: poverty has declined substantially and inequality has increased modestly.  
 
While these facts are well known, there is less agreement about their interpretation. Many 
researchers have pointed out that the decline in expenditure-based measures of poverty might not 
be telling us the complete story. A key fact that has emerged, alongside the decline in poverty, is 
the increase in the prevalence of undernutrition. In our previous research, we have argued that 
this puzzling phenomenon – declining poverty and rising undernutrition – is partly explained by 
a food budget squeeze (Basole and Basu, 2015). Galloping expenditure on nonfood essentials, 
driven by structural changes as much as by voluntary choice, has squeezed food budgets. 
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Diversification of diets, acting in conjunction with stagnant food budgets, have led to declining 
calorie intake.    
 
In this paper, we explore the importance of nonfood expenditure from another angle: its impact 
on aggregate consumption inequality. By disaggregating food and non-food expenditure in India, 
we show that overall consumption inequality, tracked with relative inequality measures like the 
Gini coefficient or percentile ratios, has increased mainly because the share of non-food 
spending has increased in the household consumption basket. The relative Gini coefficient of 
food and non-food spending have not increased much. But since nonfood spending, by its very 
nature, is likely to be more unequal at any point in time (since it lacks a physiological upper 
bound), overall inequality increases when its importance in the budget increases.  
 
The relative Gini coefficient is not sensitive to increases in the absolute gap in expenditures, or 
the relative deprivation, at the aggregate level. To capture this latter aspect, we investigate the 
evolution of absolute and intermediate Gini coefficients, the latter being preferable because it is 
unit consistent. We find that the absolute and intermediate Gini coefficient of non-food 
expenditure has increased several-fold in the analysis period. This is a matter of great concern. 
To the extent that such consumption is a marker for economic development, it seems clear that 
the fruits of development have largely accrued to the upper MPCE deciles. 
 
This type of growth process also has important macroeconomic consequences. The robust 
growth in elite demand for consumer durables and services is not expected to generate 
employment to the same extent as a more broad-based demand for manufactured goods and 
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labor-intensive services used by the poor (Kannan and Raveendran, 2009). Thus, not only does 
the growth process create inequality, it also fails to generate jobs, further compounding the 
problem of low incomes for the majority. 
 
Finally, the fact that most of the increases in aggregate consumption inequality are driven by 
expenditures on nonfood items have important policy implications. Recall that a large part of this 
broad category of “nonfood” includes items like education, health care, transportation, and 
housing. The large increases in the inequality of expenditure – especially if measured with the 
absolute or intermediate Gini coefficient – arise from the private provisioning of such services. 
Therefore, one way to mitigate inequality as economic growth picks up, is for the State to step in 
and improve public provisioning of education, health care, transportation, and housing. While 
this would have obvious progressive redistributive implications, it is important to note that it 
would have at least two additional beneficial impacts. Problems of asymmetric information 
plague private provisioning of such services, so that increasing the share of public provisioning 
would have positive efficiency and welfare effects. Moreover, public provisioning of such 
services would reduce the bite of the “food budget squeeze” and improve the nutritional status of 
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Figure 1: Food (dark) and Non-Food (light) Expenditures in Total Household Expenditure. Real 
expenditures are in the left column and shares in the right column. All India (top row), Rural 











































































































 Figure 2: Real spending on food (top) and non-food (bottom) all India across expenditure 





























































 Figure 3: Growth rate of real expenditure between 1987-88 and 2011-12 in rural (dark) and 






















Table 1: Average Expenditure on Main Nonfood Categories in Rural India 
 1987-88 1993-94 2004-05 2009-10 2011-12 
Fuel      
  Nominal (Rs.) 9.71 16.46 52.82 81.05 107.96 
  Real (1960 rupees) 1.51 1.45 2.60 2.57 3.17 
  Share (%) 6.68 6.00 9.44 8.95 8.93 
Education      
  Nominal (Rs.) 1.81 3.75 16.11 33.96 45.32 
  Real (1960 rupees) 0.28 0.32 0.78 1.08 1.33 
  Share (%) 3.27 2.31 3.66 4.27 4.26 
Healthcare      
  Nominal (Rs.) 7.42 16.05 40.01 64.05 109.96 
  Real (1960 rupees) 1.15 1.40 1.94 2.01 3.21 
  Share (%) 3.55 4.50 5.14 5.09 6.53 
Services      
  Nominal (Rs.) 3.31 7.33 22.17 46.81 61.25 
  Real (1960 rupees) 0.51 0.63 1.08 1.48 1.80 
  Share (%) 2.36 2.56 3.34 4.41 4.40 
Conveyance      
  Nominal (Rs.) 3.44 6.76 22.10 39.61 64.35 
  Real (1960 rupees) 0.54 0.59 1.08 1.25 1.88 
  Share (%) 3.25 3.30 3.82 3.93 4.48 
Clothing and Footwear      
  Nominal (Rs.) 10.14 17.81 46.33 69.41 104.35 
  Real (1960 rupees) 1.57 1.54 2.27 2.19 3.06 
  Share (%) 6.70 6.45 8.20 7.52 8.37 
Durables      
  Nominal (Rs.) 3.70 5.45 23.66 43.16 72.28 
  Real (1960 rupees) 0.56 0.47 1.14 1.36 2.12 
  Share (%) 2.58 2.68 3.24 3.57 3.79 
Rent      
  Nominal (Rs.) 0.64 1.35 3.68 5.16 8.08 
  Real (1960 rupees) 0.10 0.12 0.18 0.17 0.24 
  Share (%) 7.19 5.70 7.29 4.77 5.48 





Table 2: Average Expenditure on Main Nonfood Categories in Urban India 
 1987-88 1993-94 2004-05 2009-10 2011-12 
Fuel      
  Nominal (Rs.) 18.36 33.26 113.64 159.18 203.83 
  Real (1960 rupees) 2.43 2.58 4.41 4.21 4.48 
  Share (%) 7.71 7.48 10.71 9.23 9.01 
Education      
  Nominal (Rs.) 7.59 16.94 73.09 146.35 185.33 
  Real (1960 rupees) 1.01 1.32 2.86 3.85 4.05 
  Share (%) 4.42 4.44 6.82 7.73 7.53 
Healthcare      
  Nominal (Rs.) 9.02 24.08 69.57 118.79 176.99 
  Real (1960 rupees) 1.18 1.84 2.67 3.13 3.85 
  Share (%) 3.00 4.00 4.91 5.00 5.77 
Services      
  Nominal (Rs.) 7.60 17.14 84.76 147.85 178.09 
  Real (1960 rupees) 1.00 1.31 3.24 3.87 3.85 
  Share (%) 2.69 2.88 5.17 5.95 5.42 
Conveyance      
  Nominal (Rs.) 9.60 22.13 74.26 126.45 197.10 
  Real (1960 rupees) 1.26 1.69 2.85 3.32 4.27 
  Share (%) 4.30 5.02 5.49 5.59 6.26 
Clothing and Footwear      
  Nominal (Rs.) 18.90 28.73 77.76 127.57 183.40 
  Real (1960 rupees) 2.50 2.22 3.03 3.37 4.02 
  Share (%) 7.18 6.15 7.00 6.77 7.36 
Durables      
  Nominal (Rs.) 8.07 10.47 56.74 110.08 166.75 
  Real (1960 rupees) 1.05 0.79 2.17 2.87 3.66 
  Share (%) 3.13 2.64 3.57 3.85 4.23 
Rent      
  Nominal (Rs.) 13.33 24.72 78.98 151.16 211.82 
  Real (1960 rupees) 1.76 1.90 3.05 3.92 4.56 
  Share (%) 10.12 11.11 14.49 15.76 16.52 





 Table 3: Relative, Absolute and Intermediate Gini Coefficients in India 
 1987-88 1993-94 2004-05 2009-10 2011-12 
      
 RURAL 
Relative Gini      
total 0.289 0.274 0.289 0.291 0.301 
food 0.265 0.245 0.242 0.239 0.243 
nonfood 0.403 0.394 0.387 0.391 0.395 
      
Absolute Gini      
total 7.091 6.795 8.519 9.070 11.872 
food 4.316 3.925 3.817 3.919 4.629 
nonfood 3.325 3.456 5.288 5.758 8.042 
      
Intermediate Gini      
total 2.048 1.865 2.464 2.640 3.577 
food 1.142 0.962 0.922 0.936 1.124 
nonfood 1.338 1.363 2.049 2.249 3.178 
      
 URBAN 
Relative Gini      
total 0.333 0.327 0.378 0.382 0.378 
food 0.286 0.271 0.283 0.273 0.272 
nonfood 0.435 0.434 0.465 0.475 0.462 
      
Absolute Gini      
total 11.651 12.228 17.765 20.352 22.303 
food 5.690 5.549 5.325 5.615 5.859 
nonfood 6.595 7.338 13.110 15.520 17.322 
      
Intermediate Gini      
total 3.880 3.999 6.716 7.774 8.425 
food 1.630 1.503 1.507 1.531 1.596 
nonfood 2.871 3.182 6.099 7.369 7.995 






Table 4: Percentile ratios for food, non-food, and total expenditure  
 Rural  Urban 
 p90/p10 p90/p50 p10/p50  p90/p10 p90/p50 p10/p50 
        
 Total Expenditure  Total Expenditure 
1987-88 3.31 1.93 0.58  4.32 2.24 0.52 
1993-94 3.17 1.85 0.58  4.16 2.20 0.53 
2004-05 3.27 1.95 0.60  5.06 2.48 0.49 
2009-10 3.31 1.94 0.59  5.10 2.45 0.48 
2011-12 3.46 2.01 0.58  5.09 2.41 0.47 
 Food Expenditure  Food Expenditure 
1987-88 3.14 1.82 0.58  3.59 1.98 0.55 
1993-94 2.97 1.74 0.59  3.38 1.91 0.56 
2004-05 2.88 1.74 0.60  3.33 1.89 0.57 
2009-10 2.86 1.71 0.60  3.37 1.89 0.56 
2011-12 2.93 1.73 0.59  3.29 1.81 0.55 
 Nonfood Expenditure  Nonfood Expenditure 
1987-88 5.27 2.46 0.47  6.93 2.87 0.41 
1993-94 5.04 2.36 0.47  6.71 2.82 0.42 
2004-05 4.73 2.46 0.52  8.12 3.12 0.38 
2009-10 4.89 2.41 0.49  8.11 3.11 0.38 
2011-12 5.01 2.52 0.50   7.81 3.03 0.39 
Source: Authors' calculations from unit level data on real expenditure. 
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Table 5: Decomposition of the Gini Coefficient of Total Expenditure into Food and Nonfood Components 














       
RURAL       
1987-88 Food 0.66 0.26 0.95 0.17 0.58 
 Non Food 0.34 0.40 0.90 0.12 0.42 
       
1993-94 Food 0.65 0.25 0.93 0.15 0.54 
 Non Food 0.35 0.39 0.91 0.13 0.46 
       
2004-05 Food 0.54 0.24 0.92 0.12 0.41 
 Non Food 0.46 0.39 0.95 0.17 0.59 
       
2009-10 Food 0.53 0.24 0.91 0.11 0.39 
 Non Food 0.47 0.39 0.95 0.18 0.61 
       
2011-12 Food 0.48 0.24 0.90 0.11 0.35 
 Non Food 0.52 0.40 0.96 0.20 0.65 
       
URBAN       
       
1987-88 Food 0.57 0.29 0.94 0.15 0.46 
 Non Food 0.43 0.44 0.95 0.18 0.54 
       
1993-94 Food 0.55 0.27 0.93 0.14 0.42 
 Non Food 0.45 0.43 0.96 0.19 0.58 
       
2004-05 Food 0.40 0.28 0.91 0.10 0.27 
 Non Food 0.60 0.47 0.98 0.27 0.73 
       
2009-10 Food 0.39 0.27 0.90 0.10 0.25 
 Non Food 0.61 0.47 0.98 0.29 0.75 
       
2011-12 Food 0.36 0.27 0.89 0.09 0.23 
  Non Food 0.64 0.46 0.99 0.29 0.77 
Source: Authors' calculations from unit level data on real expenditure. 
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 Table 6: Relative, Absolute, and Intermediate Gini Coefficient for Non-Food Items 
 RURAL URBAN 
 1987-88 1993-94 2004-05 2009-10 2011-12 1987-88 1993-94 2004-05 2009-10 2011-12 
Relative Gini           
Fuel 0.419 0.443 0.371 0.363 0.353 0.334 0.337 0.333 0.334 0.325 
Education 0.654 0.621 0.661 0.697 0.690 0.628 0.608 0.650 0.680 0.668 
Healthcare 0.656 0.638 0.664 0.667 0.678 0.622 0.664 0.665 0.678 0.675 
Conveyance 0.595 0.593 0.613 0.607 0.607 0.633 0.628 0.627 0.608 0.617 
Services 0.557 0.556 0.550 0.511 0.472 0.632 0.657 0.666 0.600 0.588 
Durables 0.763 0.726 0.750 0.748 0.784 0.825 0.809 0.815 0.823 0.816 
Clothing 0.408 0.395 0.308 0.308 0.307 0.419 0.422 0.376 0.394 0.383 
Absolute Gini           
Fuel 0.637 0.645 0.964 0.934 1.122 0.825 0.875 1.474 1.409 1.456 
Education 0.249 0.261 0.628 0.873 1.057 0.820 0.979 2.148 2.950 3.016 
Healthcare 0.961 1.115 1.519 1.528 2.367 0.949 1.490 2.070 2.401 2.832 
Conveyance 0.424 0.459 0.766 0.854 1.238 0.973 1.271 1.961 2.174 2.765 
Services 0.330 0.380 0.608 0.769 0.860 0.675 0.888 2.177 2.337 2.273 
Durables 0.491 0.404 0.906 1.071 1.710 0.950 0.716 1.853 2.458 3.056 
Clothing 0.677 0.720 0.701 0.679 0.939 1.076 1.087 1.140 1.329 1.542 
Intermediate Gini           
Fuel 0.267 0.286 0.358 0.339 0.396 0.276 0.295 0.491 0.471 0.473 
Education 0.163 0.162 0.415 0.609 0.729 0.515 0.595 1.396 2.007 2.013 
Healthcare 0.631 0.712 1.009 1.019 1.605 0.590 0.989 1.377 1.628 1.912 
Conveyance 0.252 0.272 0.470 0.519 0.751 0.616 0.798 1.229 1.322 1.704 
Services 0.184 0.211 0.334 0.393 0.406 0.427 0.583 1.449 1.401 1.337 
Durables 0.374 0.294 0.679 0.801 1.341 0.784 0.579 1.511 2.024 2.494 
Clothing 0.276 0.284 0.216 0.209 0.288 0.451 0.458 0.429 0.523 0.591 
Source: Authors' calculation from unit-level data.         
 39 
